Ordered Consumer Search by Armstrong, Mark
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Ordered Consumer Search
Mark Armstrong
Department of Economics, University of Oxford
24 June 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/72194/
MPRA Paper No. 72194, posted 25 June 2016 03:04 UTC
Ordered Consumer Search
Mark Armstrong
June 2016
Abstract
The paper discusses situations in which consumers search through their options
in a deliberate order, in contrast to more familiar models with random search. Topics
include: network e¤ects (consumers may be better o¤ following the same search order
as other consumers); the use of price and non-price advertising to direct search; the
impact of consumers starting a new search with their previous supplier; the incentive
sellers have to merge or co-locate with other sellers; and the incentive a seller can
have to raise its own search cost. I also show how ordered search can be reformulated
as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions.
Keywords: Consumer search, sequential search, ordered search, directed search,
discrete choice, oligopoly, advertising, obfuscation.
1 Introduction
Consider a consumer who wishes to purchase one product from several variants available.
In some cases she might know exactly what she wants in advance, and no prior market
investigation is needed. In other situations, she might be so ill-informed that she stumbles
randomly from one option to another until she discovers something suitable. Between these
extremes, though, the consumer has some initial idea about which options are more likely to
be suitable, or cheaper, or easier to inspect, and she will deliberately investigate these rst.
(She will go on to investigate other options if she is disappointed by what she nds there.)
For instance, in an online book market De los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildenbeest (2012,
Table 6) report: of those consumers who searched for a book only once, 69% inspected
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Amazon; of those who searched two sellers, 57% inspected Amazon rst, and Amazon also
had a large share of the second inspections of those consumers who rst inspected other
sellers.
In more detail, there are several reasons why a consumer might choose to conduct her
search for a product in a deliberate order. A consumer might have ex ante product (or
brand) preferences in place from the start, and she anticipates she is more likely to like
some products than others. Nelson (1970, page 312) writes that consumer search need
not be conducted at random. Prior to sampling, a consumer can obtain information
from relatives and friends, consumer magazines, or even from advertising.1 Relatedly, the
consumer might consult an intermediary to recommend a search order to her. For instance,
enquiring about hotels in a city on specied dates from an online travel agent may generate
a list of available options ordered according to the travel agents ranking algorithm, and if
the algorithm is good the consumer will do well to search in the suggested order.2 General
purpose search engines also aim to order their non-sponsored (organic) results according
to estimated relevance to the consumer.3
Search might be directed by prices, in the sense that sellers advertise their prices to
consumers in advance (for instance on the internet). When products are otherwise sym-
metric consumers will then choose to inspect products in order of increasing price, and
more generally prices can be used to attract consumers (which is not possible when prices
are discovered after search, when a sellers price can be used only to retain consumers who
choose to inspect that seller). Search might also be directed by non-price advertising, so
that consumers start their search at the seller which advertises the most heavily. Rational
consumers might anticipate that the seller that spends the most on advertising will turn
out to o¤er the lowest price or the most suitable product. For instance, when consumers
1In footnote 9 Nelson writes that he has a detailed theory of guided search which could not be
included here because of space limitations.
2Ursu (2015) studies such a travel agent empirically. An important feature of her dataset is that the
travel agent randomized its recommendations to some consumers, which allows her to study the e¤ect
of rank on click rates and purchase decisions in a clean way. In the random order treatment, consumers
clicked on links with decreasing frequency further down the page (since presumably they believe the ranking
has some content) but their purchase probability contingent on clicking does not depend on page position.
However, when the travel agents true ranking was displayed, the purchase probability did depend strongly
on rank, suggesting that the ranking algorithm was indeed useful to consumers as a guide to search.
3Baye, De los Santos, and Wildenbeest (2016) document how the tra¢ c generated by organic results
from a search engine to a retailer depends on both the retailers prominence on the results page and the
prominence of the retailers brand. (They estimate the latter by measuring how frequently consumers
search for the brand by name when looking for a product.)
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use a search engine it might be that the most relevant seller for them is the seller that
bids the most to be displayed rst in the sponsored search results, in which case consumers
should inspect sellers in the order they appear on the results page.
If other consumers follow a particular search order, it can be optimal for an individual
consumer to do the same. When many consumers search through sellers in the same
order, a seller placed earlier in this order will often set a lower price than its rivals further
back. A seller placed further back knows that a consumer it encounters is likely to have
been disappointed in the o¤ers received so far from the sellers perspective, this is a
form of advantageous selection and so it can a¤ord to set a high price. In such cases,
an individual consumer then does better to search in the same order as other consumers.
Because of this, if other consumers use a rule of thumb for choosing which seller to inspect
rst for example, as above they rst inspect the seller which advertises with the greatest
intensity, or even if they use a more ad hoc procedure such as searching through sellers in
alphabetical order then an individual consumer should do the same. Similarly, it may be
that one seller has managed to achieve a low price imagewhich induces consumers to
try there rst, and in equilibrium this seller does have an incentive to choose lower prices.
This kind of self-fullling prophecy means that a highly skewed pattern of sales can emerge
even in symmetric environments.
Some products have lower search costs than others. For instance, geography or shop
layout determines a consumers search order, and she might choose to inspect the nearest
option rst (which might be di¤erent for di¤erent consumers). In a physical store it is easier
to inspect products displayed at eye level or on the ground oor, regulation might require
certain products to be on the top shelf, while unhealthy products aimed at children might
protably be placed at a lower height. Judicious design of store layout might mean that a
multiproduct seller can force the consumer to consider its products in a particular order.
Consumers might nd it less costly to inspect a new product from a supplier they have
used before than from a new supplier, perhaps because they have contact details readily
available.
Another way to reduce search costs is to rst visit a location (either physical or online)
known to have a concentration of varieties of the relevant product. A cluster with several
suppliers not only allows a better chance of nding a good product, but competition be-
tween suppliers within the cluster might lead to lower prices. Similarly, a consumer might
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choose to rst visit a big boxstore which stocks more varieties of the product in question.
However, because pricing is coordinated within the store, it is likely that the store will set
a higher price than its smaller rivals, and consumers choosing their search order have to
trade o¤ the one-stop shopping benets of greater variety with the higher price they will
have to pay there.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the principles govern-
ing optimal sequential search in fairly general terms, and shows how the search problem
can be reformulated as a simpler discrete choice problem without search frictions. Section
3 uses this theory to describe outcomes in a model where sellers choose prices for their
products. In simple settings where each consumer views the sellers as symmetric ex ante,
this model often exhibits multiple equilibria: the consumer search order depends on which
sellers choose lower prices, and the prices that sellers choose depend on where they are
in the search order. Random consumer search is one equilibrium (and is often the fo-
cus of existing oligopoly models), although it is often an unstable equilibrium. However,
if the demand system is smoothed, by making individual consumers have su¢ ciently
heterogeneous preferences over sellers, the market might have a single equilibrium.
Extensions to this basic model are presented in section 4, which aim to illustrate several
of the reasons for ordered search described above. These include discussions of how multi-
seller clusters and big box sellers should often be inspected rst by consumers, how
sellers chooses prices when they anticipate that consumers start a new search process with
their previous supplier, how it might be protable for a seller to deliberately increase
its inspection costs, and the impact of both price and non-price advertising on market
outcomes. Section 5 suggests some promising options for further research. The relevant
literature, much of which is very recent, is discussed as I present various aspects of ordered
search in the paper.
2 Opening the box
Consider a consumer who wishes to select one product from several variants which are
available. One way to model this decision problem is to suppose that the consumer knows
in advance her idiosyncratic match utility for each product i, say vi, and knows in advance
each products price, pi, and chooses the option with the highest net surplus vi pi provided
this is positive. This is the discrete choiceproblem. This paper studies another scenario,
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where before purchase the consumer needs to incur a cost si to discover product is char-
acteristics, vi and pi. (In section 4.5 I also study a scenario between these two extremes,
where consumers know each products price in advance but need to discover the associated
match utility.4) The kinds of products where consumers have idiosyncratic tastes, and
which they usually wish to inspect in some way before buying (even if they know the price
in advance), include cameras, cars, clothing, furniture, hotels, novels, perfume, and pets.
Before studying in the next section how equilibrium prices in an oligopoly are deter-
mined, we rst describe the risk-neutral consumers optimal search strategy for a given set
of options. Weitzman (1979) provides the key to understanding optimal sequential search
through a nite number of mutually exclusive options (boxes) with uncertain payo¤s.
The consumers payo¤ from option i is a random variable vi  0, where her payo¤s are
independently distributed across options with CDF Fi(vi) for option i. (It is natural to
suppose the payo¤ vi is non-negative if the consumer has an outside option of zero.) To
discover the realization of vi inside box i involves the non-refundable inspection cost si.
There is free recall, so that the consumer can costlessly return to claim the payo¤ from
a box opened earlier. The consumer wishes to consume at most one of the options, and
aims to maximize the expected value of the consumed option net of total search costs. To
do this she decides both the order in which to inspect options and the rule for when to
terminate search (in which case she consumes the best option opened so far). Weitzman
refers to this as Pandoras problem, and the consumer is female in this paper.5
For now, suppose that i  Eivi > si for each i, for otherwise it is never optimal to
open box i and this option can be eliminated from her choice problem. (Here, Ei denotes
taking expectations with respect to the distribution for vi.) Dene the reservation price
of box i to be the unique price ri which satises
Ei maxfvi   ri; 0g = si : (1)
(Since i > si, this reservation price is positive.) In terms of demand theory, ri is the
highest price such that the consumer is willing to incur the sunk cost si for the right to
purchase the product at that price once she has discovered her match utility. The expected
incremental benet of inspecting box i given that the consumer already has secured a
4The remaining conguration, where consumers know their match utilities in advance but must incur
search costs to discover the associated prices, su¤ers from the problem of hold-up and market shut-down,
as initially discussed by Diamond (1971).
5This is not particularly apt terminology, as in the myth there is just one box.
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potential payo¤ x  0 to which she can freely return is
Ei maxfvi; xg   si   x = Ei maxfvi   x; 0g   si ; (2)
which is positive if and only if her current payo¤ x is below the reservation price ri.
Weitzman shows that an optimal search strategy in this context Pandoras rule is
as follows.6
Selection rule: If a box is to be opened, it should be the unopened box with the highest
reservation price;
Stopping rule: Terminate search whenever the maximum payo¤ discovered so far exceeds
the reservation price of all unopened boxes (which is zero if no box remains unopened),
and consume the option with this maximum payo¤.
For instance, suppose there are three boxes with respective reservation prices ri and
realized payo¤s vi given by
(r1; v1) = (5; 2) ; (r2; v2) = (10; 4) ; (r3; v3) = (3; 7) : (3)
Then the consumer (who of course does not know the realized payo¤ vi until she opens
that box) should rst inspect box 2 as that has the highest reservation price, should go
on to inspect box 1 (since that box has reservation price above her current payo¤ v2 = 4),
then come back to consume the payo¤ in box 2 without inspecting box 3 (since v2 is above
both v1 and r3).
The reservation price in (1) depends only on the properties of that option, i.e., si and
Fi. The reservation price for a box is not the same as that boxs stand-alone surplus,
i   si. If the consumer could only choose one box to open, she would choose the box
with the highest value of i   si, which need not be the box with the highest ri.7 As is
intuitive, the reservation price in (1) is decreasing in si and increasing in [1   Fi()]. In
addition, since it depends on the right-tail of the distribution, all else equal it is increasing
in the riskiness of the option. As Weitzman (1979, page 647) puts it: Other things
6The optimality of this rule depends on a number of factors. When the consumer cannot freely return
to an earlier opened box, it may not be optimal to inspect boxes in order of their reservation values. See
Salop (1973) for an investigation of optimal order of search when there is no recall (which is a common
assumption in the job search literature). Olszewski and Weber (2015) discuss how the rule needs to be
modied when the agent gains utility from all opened boxes, while Doval (2014) considers the situation
where the agent can consume the contents of a box without inspecting it rst (and without incurring the
search cost).
7Chade and Smith (2006) analyze which boxes to inspect in non-sequential search.
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being equal, it is optimal to sample rst from distributions which are more spread out or
riskier in hopes of striking it rich early and ending the search.
Pandoras rule can conveniently be re-expressed as a simpler discrete choice prob-
lem without search frictions.8 Specically, Pandoras rule is equivalent to the choice rule
whereby the consumer chooses the payo¤ from the box with the highest index
wi  minfri; vig ; (4)
where vi is the realized payo¤ inside box i. (This is the case in the scenario in (3) above,
when box 2 was ultimately selected.) To see this, we show that box j is not chosen under
Pandoras rule when wj < wi. If rj < ri, then box i will be inspected before j, and j could
then be chosen only if it is inspected, which requires vi < rj, and then only if vi < vj,
which taken together contradict the assumption wj < wi. If instead rj > ri, then box
j is inspected before i. But then wj < wi implies vj < minfri; vig, which implies that
box j is not consumed before rst inspecting i, which then reveals a superior payo¤. In
either case, the inequality wj < wi implies that box j is not chosen. Since some box is
eventually chosen under Pandoras rule, we deduce it is the box with the highest wi. In
sum, while the box-specic index ri determines which box the consumer opens rst, the
box-specic index wi determines which box is ultimately selected.9 As shown in Theorem
1 in Kleinberg, Waggoner, and Weyl (2016), which itself builds on Weber (1992), this
reformulation of Pandoras rule allows for the elegant proof of Weitzmans result which is
presented in Appendix A below.
When a population of consumers choose their options it will often be the case that
consumers di¤er in their reservation price ri for box i. For instance, consumers might di¤er
in their cost of inspecting a given box (e.g., due to their di¤erent geographic locations) or in
their prior distribution for a boxs match utility. An individual consumer is characterized
by her list of reservation prices (r1; r2; :::) and her list of realized payo¤s (v1; v2; :::) which
via (4) generate the list (w1; w2; :::). This heterogeneous population of consumers selecting
an option via optimal sequential search can equivalently be modelled as engaging in a
discrete choice problem, where the type-(w1; w2; :::) consumer simply selects the option
8This discussion develops the analysis in Armstrong and Vickers (2015, pages 303-4), where we showed
how a search problem with free recall of earlier options can be recast as a discrete choice problem without
search frictions. (This reformulation is not possible without free recall of earlier options.)
9Since Eiwi = Ei[vi maxfvi ri; 0g] = i si, the expected value of the parameter wi is the stand-alone
surplus from box i.
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with the highest wi. The joint distribution of (w1; w2; :::) in the consumer population then
determines the demand for each option.
3 Ordered search with strategic sellers
We now put strategic sellers inside these boxes. Suppose there are a nite number of
sellers, labelled i = 1; 2; :::, which each supply a single variant of a product, where seller
i has constant marginal cost of production ci. Consumers want at most one product and
have idiosyncratic match utilities for the product from seller i, denoted vi, where vi is
not observed by the seller. A particular consumer incurs search cost si to inspect seller
i, anticipates that seller is match utility comes from the CDF Fi(vi) and believes that
her match utilities are independently distributed across sellers. Seller i chooses price ~pi,
and a consumer who buys from i obtains payo¤ vi   ~pi (excluding her search costs). The
consumer discovers seller is price ~pi and the corresponding match utility vi only after
paying the search cost si. I assume that the consumer can freely return to a previously
inspected product and there is no danger of a popular product being sold out. (These two
assumptions distinguish consumer search from the typical job search model.)
-
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Figure 1: The optimal search order with two sellers
Since the consumers decision to inspect a seller, and the order in which she inspects
sellers, depends on anticipated, not actual, prices, write pi for the anticipated price from
seller i (while ~pi is that sellers actual price). In equilibrium we will require that pi =
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~pi. Given a list of anticipated prices (p1; p2; :::), the consumers optimal search order is
described by Pandoras rule. To understand what this means we need to calculate the
reservation price of the lottery inside box i, which has anticipated payo¤maxfvi   pi; 0g.
As discussed in section 2, if pi > ri, where ri in (1) is the reservation price for the match
utility vi, it is not worthwhile for this consumer ever to inspect seller i. If pi < ri, though,
the reservation price of the box with payo¤ maxfvi   pi; 0g and search cost si is positive
and equal to ri   pi.10 Therefore, according to Pandoras rule this consumer should rst
inspect the seller with the highest ri   pi, if this is positive, and keep searching until her
maximum sampled payo¤ vk   ~pk (where ~pk is seller ks actual price) is above all of the
rj   pj for uninspected products. In general, consumers will di¤er in their reservation
prices, and Figure 1 depicts the optimal search order with two sellers in terms of the pair
(r1; r2). In particular, a consumers decision about which seller to inspect rst is akin to
a discrete choice problem where a consumer values option i at ri and chooses the option
with the highest payo¤ ri   pi (or, as shown in the shaded region, the outside option zero
if that is superior to engaging in search).
While her search order depends on anticipated prices (p1; p2; :::), a consumers purchase
decision depends also on the actual prices (~p1; ~p2; :::). Since the payo¤ from purchasing
from seller i is vi   ~pi, the discrete choice reformulation in section 2 shows that seller is
demand is the fraction of consumers for whom the index
minfri   pi; vi   ~pig (5)
is positive and higher than the corresponding index from all rival sellers. For a given
list of anticipated prices, this determines demand for the various sellers in terms of their
actual prices. Equilibrium in this market occurs when the Bertrand equilibrium in actual
prices (~p1; ~p2; :::) given anticipated prices (p1; p2; :::) coincides with these anticipated prices.
Equivalently, returning to the underlying search formulation, equilibrium occurs when (i)
consumers choose their order of search optimally given the prices they anticipate sellers
choose, and (ii) each seller chooses its price to maximize its prot given the consumer
search order and the prices chosen by rival sellers, and this price coincides with the price
anticipated by consumers.
From (5), a seller competes against its rivals (and the outside option) on two margins.
If a consumers preferences satisfy ri   pi > vi   ~pi, it is the size of the latter term
10The reservation price of this box is the x which satises Eimaxfvi pi x; 0g = si, so that x+pi = ri.
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which determines whether or not this consumer will buy from the seller, and the seller
can a¤ect this likelihood via its choice of price ~pi. Otherwise, though, it is the former
term which determines its demand, and this portion of demand is inelastic. If search costs
become negligible, this oligopoly model converges to an oligopoly model where consumers
have complete information about match utilities (v1; v2; :::) and actual prices (~p1; ~p2; :::).
Intuitively, the rst term ri   pi in (5) is rarely relevant when the search cost for seller i
is small, and this seller sells when vi   ~pi is positive and higher than the corresponding
surplus from rivals.
To illustrate, consider an example with two sellers and costless production. Each con-
sumer has match utility vi for product i = 1; 2 which is uniformly distributed on the
interval [0; 1] and has reservation price ri for this product which is also independently and
uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. (From (1), the search cost corresponding to ri is given by
si =
1
2
(1  ri)2 and so lies in the interval [0; 12 ].) Then wi in (4) is the minimum of two in-
dependent uniform variables, and so has support [0; 1] and density 2(1 wi). Among those
situations where both sellers are active, this example has a unique equilibrium and in this
equilibrium each seller chooses price p  0:49.11 (Details for this example are presented in
Appendix B below.) As in Figure 1, if a consumer searches at all she will rst inspect the
seller for which she has the higher ri. Each consumer searches in a deterministic order, but
that order di¤ers across consumers.
If this example is modied so that all search costs are zero in which case ri  1
and wi in (5) is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] the symmetric equilibrium price is p =p
2  1  0:41, which is below the corresponding price with search frictions. It is intuitive
that more signicant search frictions will tend to increase equilibrium prices. Consider a
particular seller in the market. If the inspection costs for this seller rise, it will tend to
encounter fewer but more desperateconsumers who have not found a good option from
other sellers, and this will typically give it the opportunity to raise its price. Likewise, if
the inspection costs for its rivals increase, this reduces the distribution for rj, and hence
wj, from rivals and again this tends to give the seller an incentive to raise its price. In
sum, if inspection costs rise, either for a single seller or across the market, this is likely to
11As usual, there are also less interesting equilibria in which consumers anticipate that seller i chooses
such a high price that it is not worthwhile to inspect this seller, and then this seller has no way to attract
consumers to it and might as well set this very high price. In this example, for instance, there is also an
equilibrium where seller 1 sets price p1 = 1 and no one inspects it, while seller 2 sets the monopoly price
p2 =
1
2 and a consumer inspects it if r2  12 (and then buys if v2  12 ).
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raise each sellers equilibrium price.
The double uniformexample above involves a demand system which is smooth, in the
sense that small changes in anticipated prices pi do not lead to discrete changes in demands.
In other situations which include those commonly studied in the literature the demand
system is not smooth. Specically, consider the situation in which each consumer considers
sellers to be symmetric ex ante, so that (in the duopoly case) reservation prices on Figure
1 lie on the 45o line. Here, when one seller is expected to o¤er a lower price, all consumers
who search will choose to inspect it rst. There is a strong possibility of multiple equilibria
in such a market: the consumer search order depends sensitively on anticipated prices,
while a sellers price usually depends on where it is placed in the search order.
To discuss this point in more detail, suppose each consumer has the same CDF F (v)
for match utility and the same inspection cost s from each seller, and hence has the same
reservation price r for each sellers product. Suppose also that each seller has the same
production cost c. This is the framework analyzed in the inuential models of Wolinsky
(1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999), under the assumption that consumers search
randomly through sellers. In contrast to these earlier papers, suppose instead that all
consumers search through sellers in the same order.12 If the hazard rate for match utility,
f(v)=(1 F (v)), is strictly increasing in v, then more prominent sellers (i.e., sellers closer to
the start of this search order) have more elastic demand than those sellers placed further
back. For this reason, more prominent sellers typically set lower prices, which in turn
rationalizes the assumed consumer search order. Intuitively, a seller inspected earlier in
a consumers search order knows that a prospective consumer is likely to have a superior
outside option relative to the situation where a seller is inspected later a later seller only
encounters a consumer if that consumer was disappointed by her options so far and with
an increasing hazard rate, a seller who knows a consumer has a better outside option will
choose to set a lower price. A more detailed argument for why a prominent seller faces
more elastic demand is presented in Appendix C below.
To see how ordered search can be an equilibrium in a symmetric environment, suppose
there are two symmetric sellers and look for an equilibrium where pi < pj so that seller i is
inspected rst by all consumers. Here, the pattern of demand for the two sellers is shown
12The following discussion is based on the analysis (for the uniform distribution) in Armstrong, Vickers,
and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011).
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in Figure 2.13 Appendix D below calculates equilibrium prices for various search costs
when production is costless and match utility is uniformly distributed, and shows how the
prominent rm indeed chooses a lower price in equilibrium (see Figure 4 in the appendix).
Thus there are two equilibria with ordered search, one where all consumers inspect seller 1
rst and one where they inspect seller 2 rst. There is also a third, symmetric, equilibrium,
where exactly half the consumers rst inspect each seller and where the two sellers set the
same price. However, this symmetric equilibrium which is the focus of the analysis in
Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) is unstable: if slightly more consumers
rst inspect one seller, that seller chooses to set a lower price than its rival, so that all
consumers will strictly prefer to visit that seller rst. Thus, this is a classic tipping
market, and we expect one low-price seller will be inspected rst by all consumers even
though sellers are symmetric ex ante.14
-
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Figure 2: Demand for the two sellers when pi < pj
Consumers may well be worse o¤ in an equilibrium with ordered search where they
all inspect one seller rst compared to the equilibrium with random search.15 Intuitively,
13This pattern is generated by observing that a consumer buys from seller i if minfr   pi; vi   ~pig is
positive and greater than minfr   pj ; vj   ~pjg.
14In situations where the hazard rate is decreasing, a seller which is rst inspected by more consumers
sets a higher price than its rival, and the unique and stable equilibrium has the two sellers setting the same
price and half the consumers rst inspect each seller. (In the knife-edge case of an exponential distribution
for match utility, where the hazard rate is constant, a sellers price does not depend on where it is in the
search order, and no network e¤ects are present.)
15Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) and Zhou (2011) show this to be so in the case with a uniform
distribution for match utilities. Zhou shows in this example that all prices can be higher with ordered
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faced with the increasing price path which goes with ordered search, consumers cease
their search too early and competition between sellers is weakened. In this market with
ordered search, the seller which inspected rst has larger demand for two reasons: even
with equal prices its demand would be larger because it is inspected rst (its extra demand
the north-eastregion on Figure 2), while its lower price reinforces this e¤ect. The result
is that the distribution of sales across sellers is more skewed than it would be in a market
with random search or in a market without search frictions. In the example analyzed in
Appendix D, sales are equal for the two sellers when search frictions are absent, but the
prominent seller sells up to twice as much as its rival when search costs are larger. As search
frictions increase, we expect that the prominent sellers sales volume increases, while the
non-prominent sellers sales volume will fall (see Figure 5).
In this market where sellers are symmetric ex ante, in the stable equilibrium where all
consumers visit one prominent seller rst this seller makes greater prot than its rival. (The
prominent seller could choose the equilibrium price of its rival, in which case it has greater
demand and more prot, but in general is even better o¤ with another price.) The impact
on prot of an increase in search frictions will often di¤er for the two sellers.16 Prot for
the prominent seller will rise with s since both its price and its demand do. The impact on
the non-prominent sellers prot, though, depends on two opposing forces its price rises,
but its demand is likely to fall and the result is that its prot can be non-monotonic in
the search cost (see Figure 6). When there are no search frictions both sellers choose the
same price and obtain the same prot. As s increases both sellersprots initially rise, but
for larger s the non-prominent sellers prot falls as search frictions increase. In this second
region, less prominent sellers will favour consumer policy which reduces search frictions,
while such a policy would be opposed by more prominent sellers.
The existence of multiple equilibria can make it hard to do comparative statics, such
as whether a higher-quality rm (where the match valuation distribution comes from a
better CDF) sets a higher price or is inspected rst or whether a rm with a higher
inspection cost is inspected later. For this reason a smooth demand system, where di¤erent
consumers prefer to search in di¤erent orders, might work better (as well as often being
more plausible). However, such a model can be cumbersome to work with beyond specic
search relative to the price with random search, provided there are at least four sellers.
16See also the discussion and Figure 2 in Zhou (2011). By contrast, with random search (and no outside
option), Anderson and Renault (1999, Proposition 1) show that the symmetric equilibrium prot for each
seller increases with the search cost, provided the hazard rate is increasing.
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examples or without resorting to numerical methods.
One convenient way to simplify this framework is to study monopolistic competition
with many symmetric sellers (Wolinsky, 1986), when a stable equilibrium with symmetric
prices exists in a broad class of cases.17 When a consumer expects all sellers to o¤er the
same price p < r, a consumer will search until she nds a product with v  r and will
never return to a previous seller.18 Thus a seller has no return demand, which was the
source of the incentive for prominent rms to set lower prices, and a seller sets the same
price regardless of its place in the search order. The result is that consumers do not care
how other consumers choose to search, and there is no tendency to tip. The symmetric
equilibrium price, p say, when consumers are also symmetric is derived as follows. Consider
a seller who meets a consumer. If it chooses price ~p the consumer will buy from it if
v  ~p  r p, and so the sellers prot from this consumer is (~p  c) [1 F (~p+ r p)]. In
equilibrium, this must be maximized at ~p = p, which yields the unique rst-order condition
p = c+
1  F (r)
f(r)
: (6)
The equilibrium markup and industry prot in this market, (1   F (r))=f(r), depends
on the shape of the CDF F (v) and the magnitude of search frictions. Consumers have
an incentive to participate in this market provided that p in (6) is below r. When the
hazard rate f=(1   F ) increases, the equilibrium price in (6) decreases with r and hence
increases with the search cost s. In such cases, a reduction in search frictions yields a
double benet to consumers: their average match utility is higher and the price they pay
is lower. Although this model of monopolistic competition does not necessarily involve
ordered search, it is useful starting point for some of the applications and extensions to
this basic framework presented in the next section.
17Anderson and Renault (1999) show that a symmetric equilibrium with monopolistic competition exists
provided that the hazard rate is increasing.
18Anderson and Renault (2015) discuss another way to obtain this simplifying feature. They suppose
that the distribution for match utilities for a given seller has an atom at zero combined with a continuous
distribution with a support well away from zero, and they nd equilibria with ordered search where each
seller sets price so that any consumer it encounters buys immediately when she has non-zero match utility.
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4 Applications and extensions
4.1 Mergers and clusters
There are a number of situations in which consumers incur a single search cost to inspect
several products at once. For instance, a single seller might stock several product variants,
or several single-product sellers might cluster in a single location. Unless the equilibrium
price is signicantly higher in a multiproduct location, consumers may then choose to
inspect such a location before any of the single-product locations.
To discuss this in more detail, consider a situation with monopolistic competition, where
a large number of ex ante symmetric sellers each supply a single variant of the product,
so that the equilibrium price is given by p in (6). Suppose that two of these sellers merge
to form a big boxseller which supplies two of the product variants. When a consumer
inspects this seller, she incurs the same search cost s as with any other seller but sees two
options (each with an independent match utility from the CDF F (v) and an associated
price), from which she will select the better one if she buys from this seller.19 In regular
cases, the merged rm will choose the same price for each variant, and so this seller can be
considered to be another single-product rm but one that has a better CDF for its match
utility given by F 2 instead of F . Typically, the merged rm will adjust its price upwards
relative to its rivals, which in this monopolistic competition framework continue to set the
same price p. To understand this, observe that when the merged rm meets a consumer
it will sell when its match utility and price satisfy v   ~p  r   p, and so it chooses ~p to
maximize (~p c)[1 F 2(~p+r p)]. One can check that its prot is increasing at ~p = p the
demand function [1  F 2(~p)] is less elastic than [1  F (~p)] and the big box store will set
a higher price than its single-product rivals.
Whether a consumer has an incentive to inspect this merged rm rst depends on how
high its price is. If its price does not rise by too much, a consumer will wish to inspect
this multiproduct seller rst, in which case the merger is protable. For instance, in the
example where v is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], the search cost is s = 1
32
and production
is costless, then r = 3
4
and p = 1
4
in (6). The reservation price for the merged rms match
utility can be calculated to be about 0.817 and its price to be 0.268. Since the di¤erence
between these is greater than r p = 1
2
, it is optimal for consumers to visit the merged rm
19Section 4.2 discusses issues of intra-rm search and store layout, which are sidestepped by the assump-
tion that once at the seller the consumer costlessly observes all its options.
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rst. The better chance of nding a good product in the big store outweighs the higher
price the consumer must pay there.20 More generally, a group of sellers nds it protable
to merge if the merger serves to attract consumers to visit the merged rm rst, and this
can only be the case if consumer surplus rises as a result of the merger. Thus, in this
framework there is a tendency for protable mergers to benet consumers, in contrast to
the situation in many other oligopoly models.
This discussion is a simplied version of the model studied in Moraga-Gonzalez and
Petrikaite (2013). That paper discussed the case of oligopoly rather than monopolistic
competition, and showed that a merger which results in search economies can be protable
for the merging rms but reduces the prot of non-merging rms since they are pushed
further back in the consumer search order.21 This contrasts with a more standard analysis
of Bertrand price competition, where a merger typically raises the prots of non-merging
rms.
Related issues arise when one seller decides to co-locate with another seller. To discuss
this point further, suppose that when this occurs a consumer pays the single search cost s
to visit the cluster, where she then observes both rmsprices and match utilities. Unlike
the case with a merger, here sellers in the cluster do not coordinate their pricing, and a
seller aims to attract business from its neighboring rival as well as to prevent a consumer
from leaving to inspect other locations. Provided the hazard rate is increasing, intra-cluster
competition will typically mean that the price is lower in the cluster than elsewhere. If its
rival sets price p0 and o¤ers match utility v0, then a seller which sets price ~p and o¤ers v will
sell if v  ~p  maxfv0 p0; r pg. (By contrast, a seller on its own will sell under the weaker
condition v   ~p  r   p, so that its potential consumers have a worse outside option than
those of a seller in the cluster). In the uniform example discussed in the merger scenario,
one can check that the equilibrium price in the two-seller location is about 0:232, which is
20If many single-product sellers merge, however, then a consumer is almost sure to nd a product with
almost the maximum possible match utility, and so consumers essentially know their match utility from
this seller. This implies that Diamond (1971)s paradox applies, and the seller will set a price which
just deters onward search, and this gives the consumer no incentive to incur the search cost to visit this
very large store. (See Villas-Boas (2009) for related analysis in a monopoly context.) It may take many
products for this e¤ect to operate, however. In the example in the text, if the large store contains 50
product variants it is still worthwhile for the consumer to inspect this seller rst, even though its price is
nearly double that of single-variant sellers.
21One advantage of using a monopolistic competition framework is that the problem of multiple equilibria
seems less severe. In oligopoly, when a merger occurs the new equilibrium might involve the merged rm
being at the start, or at the rear, of the consumer search order.
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below p = 1
4
. Therefore, since consumers obtain a better distribution for their match utility
and a lower price, they will all choose to visit the cluster rst. Because of this new-found
prominence, both of the sellers there are better o¤ despite the tougher competition they
face in the shared location.
A number of papers have discussed a sellers choice between a concentrated location
alongside other sellers, which attracts many consumers but where competition may be
erce, and having a more isolated location which allows the seller to exploit the few con-
sumers who do pass through. These papers discuss the equilibrium conguration of sellers,
including when it is an equilibrium for all sellers to locate in a single cluster.22 The paper
closest to my discussion above is Fischer and Harrington (1996), who present a model
with di¤erentiated products, one cluster location and many peripheralsellers, and con-
sumers who choose their search order based on rational expectations of prices chosen by
sellers in the cluster and by peripheral sellers and their own idiosyncractic search costs.
They also document empirically which product sectors around Baltimore are more prone
to clustering: shoes and antiques, where consumers like to inspect products before buying,
tend to co-locate, whereas gasoline stations are more dispersed. Because of the advantages
of clustering in terms of attracting consumers, a seller may be willing to sell its product
through an electronic platform which also serves rivals, even though it faces strong price
competition there and usually has to pay listing fees to the platform.23
4.2 Deliberate obscurity
In Fischer and Harrington (1996), rms could choose to locate in the cluster or in the
periphery. Some rms choose the latter, in part because some consumers have search
costs such that they only wish to inspect rms in the periphery. Another issue of interest
is whether it might ever be protable for a rm deliberately to raise its own inspection
cost that is, to obfuscate in order to make its rival the prominent seller. For instance,
in the UK some well-known insurance companies advertise that their products do not
appear on price-comparison websites.
To discuss this in more detail, suppose the initial situation is that there are two sym-
22For instance, see Stahl (1982), Wolinsky (1983), Dudey (1990), Non (2010) and Ellison, Fudenberg,
and Mobius (2004). Scitovsky (1950, page 49) writes: the geographical concentration of the experts
market [...] should not be considered data, as Marshall did. [It is] the result of a deliberate e¤ort on the
part of producers [...] in response to the expert buyers demand for easy comparability.
23See Song (2014) for an extension of Fischer and Harrington (1996) along these lines.
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metric sellers and are no search frictions (so the market is a duopoly version of Perlo¤
and Salop, 1985). Then consumers will investigate both sellerso¤ers and buy from the
seller with the higher vi   pi (if this is positive). In regular cases the equilibrium will be
symmetric, and rms obtain equal prot. If one rm now articially introduces a positive
inspection cost, s > 0, this will induce all consumers to inspect the rival rst (since they
have nothing to lose by doing so). The new equilibrium prices will, given an increasing haz-
ard rate, involve the prominent rival choosing the lower price, which reinforces consumer
incentives to inspect this rm rst. However, this lower price will typically still be higher
than the equilibrium price without search frictions, and this could compensate the obfus-
cating seller for its disadvantaged position. As discussed in section 3, the non-prominent
rm has an incentive to raise its price since the consumers it encounters are not satised
with their o¤er from the prominent seller, and because prices are strategic complements
this induces the prominent rm to raise its own price too. For instance, consider the ex-
ample depicted on Figure 6 below. When one rm introduces a small inspection cost (i.e.,
reduces its reservation price ri), the equilibrium prots are as shown on this gure, and we
see that a small inspection cost boosts the obfuscating rms prot a little (although the
rivals prot is boosted more).
Wilson (2010) analyzes this question using a di¤erent duopoly model with a homoge-
neous product. There are two kinds of consumers: those who can see both prices without
cost (even with obfuscation), and those who must pay the obfuscation costs articially
introduced. In this market with a homogeneous product, without obfuscation there is
Bertrand competition and zero prot. Wilson shows that it is always in a rms interest
to obfuscate, with the result that rms choose their prices according to an asymmetric
mixed strategy, costly searchers inspect the transparent rm rst, and both rms make
positive prot. One di¤erence between Wilsons model and the one presented here is that
in my model the obfuscating rm sets a higher price, while in Wilsons model that rm
(on average) sets a lower price.24
The previous example was rather delicate, and a seller had only a small incentive to
24Ellison and Wolitzky (2012) also study a model with a homogeneous product but where consumers do
not observe a rms chosen inspection cost in advance, and so a rm cannot use obfuscation to inuence
search order. They assume that search costs are convex, in the sense that the more time a consumer spends
obtaining one sellers o¤er, the less inclined she is to investigate other sellers. Armstrong and Zhou (2016)
study another way to create search frictions articially, which is when a seller chooses to make it hard for
a consumer to return to buy from it after inspecting a rival seller, for instance by o¤ering the consumer a
discount if she chooses to buy without further search.
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obfuscate. More striking and robust results are seen in the context of a multiproduct
monopolist considering how best to price and present its products. For simplicity, consider
a situation where the seller has costless production and supplies two symmetric products,
1 and 2, where each consumers match utility for product i is an independent draw from
the CDF F (v). (The argument which follows is strengthened with asymmetric products,
since then the seller can use articial search frictions to divert demand from low-margin to
high-margin products.) Suppose that unless the seller deliberately obfuscates, a consumer
observes both prices and both match utilities from the start, and chooses the product with
the higher surplus vi   pi (if this is positive). In regular cases, the seller will then choose
the same price for both products, which is chosen to maximize p[1  F 2(p)].
However, the seller can always do better than this by making one product, say product
2, costly to inspect, while leaving product 1 costless to inspect (which is therefore inspected
rst by all consumers). Indeed, we will see that the seller can then obtain as prot the
maximum value of
p1[1  F (p1)] + F (p1)p2[1  F (p2)] : (7)
Here, (7) represents the prot obtained if the seller could rst o¤er product 1 to the
consumer, at price p1, and the consumer chooses whether or not to buy this product
myopically, without considering the subsequent option to buy product 2. Since the prot
in (7) coincides with the frictionlessprot p[1 F 2(p)] with uniform prices p1 = p2 = p,
it is clear that the maximum prot in (7) is above the maximum prot without obfuscation.
Maximizing (7) involves choosing p2 = pM , where pM is the monopoly price for a single
product, i.e., which maximizes p[1   F (p)]. Suppose the seller makes the consumer incur
the search cost s for the second product so that a consumer just willing to inspect this
product when priced at pM if she has no other option, so that s satises
s = Emaxfv   pM ; 0g : (8)
Suppose also that the seller chooses its prominent price p1 to maximize (7) given p2 = pM ,
which implies p1 > pM = p2. Although consumers cannot observe p2 in advance, it is an
equilibrium for consumers to anticipate the price p2 = pM and for the seller to maximize
its prot by choosing this price. (If consumers anticipate p2 = pM , and have to incur the
search cost s in (8) to nd the corresponding match utility, Pandoras rule states they will
only choose to inspect this product if their match utility from the rst product, v1, is below
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the rst price, p1. Therefore, no consumer will ever return to buy the rst product if they
inspect the second, and so the seller chooses p2 maximize its prot as if it only sold this
single product.)
In sum, it is a credible strategy for the seller to choose the two prices p1 and p2 which
maximize (7) and to introduce the articial inspection cost s dened in (8) for product 2,
and this strategy generates higher prot than the situation without search frictions. This
policy involves an expensive product being prominently displayed, perhaps at eye level,
while a cheaper product is deliberately displayed inconveniently and the consumer has to
look high and lowfor a good deal. Somewhat akin to the model in Deneckere and McAfee
(1996), where a seller deliberately reduces the quality of one product variant in order to
facilitate price discrimination, here the seller chooses to damageits retail environment.
In regular cases, the prominent products price p1 will rise while the obscure products
price p2 falls, relative to the situation without search frictions.25 In such cases, consumers
are harmed by the obfuscation policy: the search cost (8) eliminates all consumer surplus
from product 2, while the price for product 1 is increased.
I presented here a simple variant of the model in Petrikaite (2015), who analyzes cases
with more products, with asymmetric products, and with competition between multiprod-
uct sellers. For instance, she shows that when products di¤er in quality, the seller will
choose to obfuscate the lower quality product. Gamp (2016) studies a related model where
all prices are observed by consumers from the start, and the seller can choose to make it
harder to inspect a products match utility. Among other results, he shows by example
that obfuscation of this form can increase total welfare: the benets of the low price for
the obscure product outweigh the extra search costs incurred.
4.3 Repeat business
In markets with ordered consumer search, tiny asymmetries between sellers can translate
into major di¤erences in their prots. There is a signicant advantage to a seller being
placed early in the consumer search order, simply because it meets more consumers than
its rivals placed further back. Since consumers in near-symmetric situations are near-
25Starting from the uniform price which maximizes p[1 F 2(p)], one can check that prot in (7) is locally
increasing in p1 and decreasing in p2. Note in particular that with coordinated pricing the prominent
product is likely to have a higher price than more obscure products, which is the reverse pattern predicted
in section 3 when products are supplied by separate sellers. See Zhou (2009) for further discussion of this
comparison.
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indi¤erent about which seller to inspect rst, it does not take much inducement to favour
one seller in the search order, which then causes that seller to enjoy a discrete jump in its
sales and prot. For instance, consider the case of monopolistic competition, where the
equilibrium price from each seller is (6) regardless of the search order. With random search
each seller obtains negligible sales and prot, while if one seller manages to be placed rst
in the search order perhaps because it is slightly easier to inspect or it has a slightly
superior CDF for match utility its prot jumps to
(p  c)[1  F (r)] = [1  F (r)]
2
f(r)
: (9)
One way to introduce small asymmetries between sellers is to consider a framework
where sellers supply various products over time and consumers purchase repeatedly. (This
discussion is taken from Armstrong and Zhou, 2011, section 3.) Here, it seems plausible
that a consumer who previously purchased from one seller might rst inspect the same
seller when she searches for a second product, even if there is no correlation in her match
utilities for the various products.26 For instance, she may have the contact details of this
seller to hand. In this case, the supplier of one product to a consumer becomes prominent
for that consumer when she starts the search process for the next product.
In more detail, suppose there are two product categories, 1 and 2, which consumers
buy sequentially for instance, a bank account rst and then a mortgage each of which
is supplied by many sellers in monopolistic competition. For product category i = 1; 2,
the reservation price is ri, the CDF for the match utility is Fi(v), the production cost
is ci, while the factor sellers use to discount prots from the second product when they
supply the rst product is . As in expression (9), when a supplier sells product 1 to a
consumer, that consumer will go on to generate prot from the second product equal to
[1  F2(r2)]2=f2(r2), and anticipating this prot the equilibrium price for the rst product
will be
p1 = c1 +
1  F1(r1)
f1(r1)
   [1  F2(r2)]
2
f2(r2)
:
(All sellers set the same price for the second product.) Thus, the promise of prot from the
second product induces rms to lower the price for the rst product, perhaps to below its
cost. When search frictions are larger for the second product, this will usually lead rms
26If a consumers match utilities for a given sellers products were positively correlated, then presumably
a consumer has a strict incentive to start her next search at the seller she purchased from previously. Such
a model is considerably more complicated to analyze, however.
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to o¤er a lower price for the rst product. This outcome is reminiscent of markets with
switching costs. When switching costs are small, though, they have little impact on the
outcome, while here a tiny default bias leads to large e¤ects, and these e¤ects benet
consumers.
Garcia and Shelegia (2015) present a related model, where a consumer is inclined to
start her search process at a seller where she has observed someone else make a purchase.
Again, because making a sale makes the seller prominent in a consumers mind, albeit a
di¤erent consumers mind, sellers have an incentive to price low in equilibrium.
4.4 Non-price advertising
Non-price advertising can be used by sellers to achieve prominence if consumers are more
likely to rst inspect those sellers which advertise most heavily. This consumer behaviour
might stem from psychological factors, if consumers most easily recall sellers from which
they have seen adverts. Alternatively, rational consumers could use advertising intensity
as a means by which to coordinate on their search order or as a means to choose which
seller is more likely to provide a suitable product.
Consider rst a situation with rational consumers who use advertising to coordinate
on their rst seller, anticipating that the price will be lower from the seller which spends
the most on advertising. (As discussed in section 3, of the hazard-rate condition holds
and sellers are symmetric ex ante, when a fraction of consumers use the rule of thumb of
rst inspecting that seller which advertises the most, that seller will choose a lower price
and it is optimal to mimic that search order.) Consider a two-stage framework where two
risk-neutral sellers rst choose their advertising intensities and then choose their prices.
Let H be a sellers equilibrium prot (excluding advertising costs) in the second stage if
it is prominent and let L < H be the corresponding prot for the non-prominent seller.
The rst stage, in which sellers compete to become prominent by advertising the most,
is then a symmetric all-pay auction with complete information.27 It is clear that no pure
strategy equilibrium for advertising can exist, since spending a little more than your rival
on advertising generates a discrete jump in prot. However, a simple symmetric mixed
strategy equilibrium for advertising exists. If H(a) denotes the equilibrium probability
27See Barut and Kovenock (1998) for further analysis of this auction. A very similar model to the one
presented here has sellers competing to pay an intermediary for prominent display, where the seller which
pays the most obtains the prominent position (which all consumers inspect rst) and the loser obtains a
more obscure position, and then sellers choose their prices given their position.
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that a seller spends less than a on advertising in the rst stage, a sellers expected prot
when it spends a on advertising is
H(a)H + [1 H(a)]L   a : (10)
(With probability H(a) it wins the contest and enjoys high prot H , and otherwise it
becomes the less prominent seller.) Since a seller can obtain prot L by not advertising at
all, in equilibrium prot in (10) must be identically equal to L over the range of advertising
used, so that H(a) = a
H L for 0  a  H   L. Thus in equilibrium each seller chooses
its advertising according to the uniform distribution on the interval [0; H   L].28 The
seller which advertises more will o¤er the lower price. Each seller spends 1
2
(H   L) on
advertising on average, and since we expect that the benet of prominence, H   L, is
higher when the search cost s is higher (for instance, see Figure 6), this model suggests that
there is more advertising in markets with higher search frictions. Competition to advertise
the most acts to dissipate prot so that sellers earn average prot equal to the low level
associated with not being prominent, L, which as shown on Figure 6 can decrease with
the search cost s.
This analysis is similar to Bagwell and Ramey (1994), who analyze a model where sellers
o¤er a homogeneous product and consumers must choose from where to buy before they
observe the sellers choice of price. Because sellers in their model have increasing returns
to scale, when more consumers turn up to buy from a seller that seller o¤ers a lower
price. Thus, consumers benet from coordinating on a seller, and a fraction of consumers
rationally go to the seller which advertises the most heavily as the means with which to
do this. By contrast, the model above assumes no economies of scale but instead uses the
feature that sellers who attract more rst visits have more elastic demand. Bagwell and
Ramey (1994) also report empirical studies (for eye-glasses, liquor, and prescription drugs)
which show how prices were lower and market structure was more concentrated in markets
where advertising was permitted, even when prices could not be advertised.
Haan and Moraga-Gonzalez (2011) analyze a related model, but where a sellers share
of rst-inspections is continuous in its choice of advertising intensity instead of the winner
take allformulation discussed here. They focus on a symmetric equilibrium where sellers
28Of course, here and elsewhere in this section another equilibrium exists: consumers do not respond to
advertising and choose to inspect sellers in random order, in which case sellers are not prepared to invest
in advertising. However, this equilibrium is fragile, in the sense that if some fraction of consumers do use
advertising to guide their search order, it pays all consumers to do the same.
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advertise with the same intensity, obtain the same share of initial searches, and so charge
the same price. Their model involves behavioural rather than fully rational consumers: if
one seller advertises slightly more heavily than its rival and this induces more consumers
to inspect it rst, that seller will charge a lower price and hence all consumers should
rationally visit that seller rst.
An alternative scenario involves advertising intensity being associated with the most
suitable, rather than the cheapest, products. For instance, consider a stylized setting
where prices are not modelled and sellers di¤er in how many consumers nd their products
suitable. Specically, a type-q seller o¤ers a product which each consumer has probability
q of nding suitable, in which case the consumer obtains payo¤ 1, and with remaining
probability 1   q she obtains payo¤ zero, while a seller obtains payo¤ 1 each time its
product is sold. Here, sellers di¤er only in their probability of being suitable, q, which is
private information and generated by the continuous CDF G(q) with support [qmin; qmax].
Suppose a consumers search cost s satises 0 < s < qmin, so that this cost is small enough
that a consumer always wishes to inspect another seller if she has not yet found a suitable
product. To minimize her search costs, a consumer would like to inspect sellers in order of
decreasing q if she could identify that order.
One could study this market when, as above, a sellers advertising is simply broad-
castwithout mediation and consumers rst inspect the seller which advertises the most
heavily. However, it is perhaps implausible that consumers can really detect accurately
which seller advertises the most heavily, especially when sellers advertise a similar amount.
An alternative scenario involves sellers paying to be advertised on a search engine, where
the seller who chooses to pay more is listed higher up the sponsored results page (which is
a transparent signal for consumers to observe). Provided that better sellers do choose to
pay more, it is optimal for consumers to inspect sellers that is, to click on their links in
the order they appear on the results page.29 If a consumer clicks on its link a seller will
obtain payo¤ 1 with probability q, and so q is the value of a click to the type-q seller.
In broad terms, sponsored search auctions allocate sellers to prominent positions, re-
quire sellers to pay the search engine fee each time a consumer clicks on their link, and use
a second-price auction format. In more detail, consider the situation with just two sellers.
29Note that in this framework the top link is not intrinsically easier to inspect. It may be more realistic
to suppose for psychological reasons that some consumers do nd it easiest to work downwards through
the links, but this will only reinforce the incentive to pay for prominence.
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These sellers are invited to submit sealed bids, the higher bidder is listed rst and pays
the bid of the losing seller on a per-click basis, while the losing seller pays nothing but
is placed second on the page. We look for a symmetric equilibrium in which the type-q
seller bids B(q), where B() is a strictly increasing function. Such a bidding function can
be derived using standard auction techniques. Suppose that the type-q seller bids as if it
had type q0, i.e., bids B(q0), while its rival has uncertain type ~q and bids B(~q), in which
case the seller is listed rst when ~q < q0. When it is listed rst, consumers inspect it rst
and so it sells to a consumer with probability q. If it loses the auction it is placed second,
in which case it sells when the rival doesnt sell and when its own product is suitable, i.e.,
with probability (1   ~q)q. Putting this together implies the sellers expected prot when
it bids B(q0) is Z q0
qmin
[q  B(~q)]dG(~q) +
Z qmax
q0
[(1  ~q)q]dG(~q) ;
and di¤erentiating this expression with respect to q0 and setting q0 = q reveals that the
equilibrium bid function is
B(q) = q2 : (11)
Here, q2 is the incremental prot for a type-q seller from being in the rst versus the second
position when its rival also has type q. Since the bidding function (11) is increasing, the
more suitable seller is willing to pay more for the right to be listed rst, with the result
that consumers rationally sift through their options in the order they appear on the search
engines results page. In this setting, the observation that consumers click more often on
results placed higher up the sponsored results page is driven by the information content of
the ordering, rather than inertconsumers who blindly follow the suggested order.
This discussion of advertising on a search engine is a simple variant of Athey and
Ellison (2011).30 As they put it (page 1215): a search engine that presents sponsored
links should be thought of as an information intermediary that contributes to welfare by
providing information (in the form of an ordered list) that allows consumers to search
more e¢ ciently. Instead of the sealed bid format discussed here, they study an ascending
bid auction in which bidders observe how many bidders remain in the auction when they
decide when to drop out of the bidding. They allow for an arbitrary number of sellers, and
consumers have heterogeneous search costs. Unlike the model presented above, this means
that consumers face a complex decision about whether to click on one more link if they
30See also Chen and He (2011) for a related model.
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have not been successful so far in their search. They also analyze auction design issues
such as the choice of a reserve price.
Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009, section 3) present a model of monopolistic compe-
tition, with endogenous prices, when sellers di¤er in the quality of the product they supply
(in the sense that their distributions for match utilities are ordered in terms of rst-order
stochastic dominance). In a specic setting with uniform distributions for match utility,
we show that the highest-quality seller is willing to pay the most to become prominent,
and that consumers have an incentive to inspect this seller rst (even though it chooses a
higher price than other sellers). As with sponsored search, a sellers ability to compete for
a prominent position can guide consumers towards better, and better value, products.
The models presented in this section provide the best casefor non-price advertising to
be used to guide search: the seller which is willing to pay the most to achieve prominence is
the seller which consumers would like to inspect rst. In other situations, this coincidence
of interests need not hold perfectly or at all, and advertising is then a less reliable guide
for consumers. For example, in the model of sponsored search, sellers might di¤er both
in their likelihood of being suitable and in their expected prot from a click. In such a
setting, the seller which is willing to bid the most per-click is not always the seller which
the most consumers will nd suitable. Because of this, search engines usually use measures
of relevance as well as willingness-to-pay per click when they determine the order of
sponsored links.31
4.5 Price advertising
The nal extension to the basic model has consumers able to observe all prices from the
start, and then choosing the order with which to inspect sellers to discover the correspond-
ing match utility.32 Unlike the model in section 3 where prices were hidden until inspection,
when prices are advertised they can be used to inuence a consumers search order. In
addition, because prices are known in advance, the network e¤ects discussed in section 3
31See Athey and Ellison (2011, section VI) for further discussion. See also Gomes (2014) for a model
in which an intermediary selects one seller from a pool of heterogeneous sellers to display to consumers.
The revenue-maximizing mechanism for the intermediary, when it can only obtain revenue from sellers, is
a scoring auctionwhich balances a sellers willingness-to-pay for display with the consumers valuation
for clicking on the sellers link.
32We continue to assume that consumers cannot purchase from a seller without incurring the search
cost. Even in cases where it is possible to buy without incurring the search cost and without observing
the realized match utility, it will be optimal to inspect products before purchase if the search cost is small
enough.
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do not arise. In the model in section 3 a seller which is prominent often chooses to set a
lower price, while in the current scenario with price advertising this causality is reversed
and a seller can become prominent by virtue of advertising a lower price.
Consider rst the monopolistic competition framework above, where the equilibrium
price in the absence of price advertising was given in (6). When rms advertise their price,
the only equilibrium involves all sellers choosing price equal to marginal cost.33 Setting
price equal to cost is an equilibrium because when all its rivals do so, a seller cannot do
better with a higher price since no consumers will ever inspect it. However, if all rms
advertised price p > c, then a seller could boost its prot by advertising a slightly lower
price which attracts all consumers to inspect it rst. Thus, even though there may be
signicant search frictions and horizontal product di¤erentiation, using prices to become
prominent in the consumer search order drives price down to cost.
This framework is more complicated in oligopoly, since sellers have some market power
and price equal to cost cannot be an equilibrium. (For instance, with a nite number of
rivals, there is a chance that a seller has the only product a consumer wants.) If consumers
view sellers as symmetric ex ante, they will choose to rst inspect the rm with the lowest
advertised price and slightly undercutting a rivals price causes a discrete jump in prot.34
In such situations, prices will be chosen according to mixed strategies in equilibrium. This
is a di¢ cult model to work with, however. Unlike more familiar models of random pricing,
such as Varian (1980), here the prices o¤ered by higher-price sellers continue to a¤ect the
demand of the winningseller, since some consumers will buy from more expensive sellers
if their products have a better match. This combination of product di¤erentiation and
mixed strategies is usually hard to solve explicitly.35
The framework is made more tractable, as well as often more plausible, if consumer
demand is smoothed by supposing that consumers di¤er ex ante in which seller they wish
33If sellers can choose whether or not to advertise their price (and can advertise costlessly), the following
discussion remains valid if consumers anticipate that a seller which does not reveal its price in advance
has in fact set a high price.
34Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2009) document empirically that a seller on a price-comparison
website has demand which jumps substantially when it reduces its price to become the lowest-price seller
on the website.
35Armstrong and Zhou (2011, section 2) analyzes one version which can be solved, where a consumers
match utility from one seller is negatively correlated with her value for the rivals product. This implies
that a consumer knows precisely her payo¤ at the second seller once she inspects the rst, and so there is
no returndemand, and as usual this simplies the demand functions.
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to inspect rst, given a set of advertised prices.36 As discussed earlier, this sequential
search problem can be reformulated as a discrete choice problem without search frictions.
Given advertised prices (p1; :::; pn), expression (5) implies that a consumer chooses to buy
from the seller with the highest value of minfri   pi; vi   pig = wi   pi, provided this is
positive, where wi is dened in (4). This demand system in the case of duopoly is depicted
in Figure 3. The demand for each sellers product in terms of prices can then be calculated
given the distribution for (w1; :::; wn) in the consumer population.
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Figure 3: The choice of seller with advertised prices
Equilibrium prices in this market with advertised prices are likely to be lower than the
corresponding market with hidden prices. Intuitively, a sellers demand is more elastic with
respect to changes in its price with advertised prices than when its price is only discovered
after the consumer pays the search cost. This can be seen formally from expression (5),
where a sellers loss of demand when it increases its price ~pi is smaller than if both pi and ~pi
were increased simultaneously (as is the case with advertised prices). In addition, since the
advantage of being prominent increases with search frictions, with advertised prices it is
plausible that an increase in search frictions intensies competition to be prominent, with
the result that equilibrium prices fall. Again, this can be understood using the discrete
36Choi, Dai, and Kim (2016), Haan, Moraga-Gonzalez, and Petrikaite (2015) and Shen (2014) study
models of price advertising in situations of this form. In each paper, the authors suppose that a consumers
match utility is the sum of two independent components, and the consumer knows one component from
the start which gives rise to ex ante brand preferences. Choi, Dai, and Kim (2016) also use a discrete
choice re-formulation of the search model to obtain their results.
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choice perspective, where an increase in search costs reduces a consumers list of reservation
prices ri and hence causes her adjusted valuations wi to fall stochastically. It is natural
that, in many cases, a fall in the distribution for valuations in an oligopoly discrete choice
model will lead to lower equilibrium prices.
To illustrate these observations, consider the double uniformexample from section
3, where variation in ri stems from heterogeneous inspection costs si rather than from
heterogeneous distributions for match utility Fi.37 Using Figure 3 one can calculate the
symmetric equilibrium price which in this example is about 0.31. In the same example
with hidden prices, we saw that the symmetric equilibrium price was about 0.49 which,
as expected, is above the equilibrium advertised price. If the example is modied so that
search costs are identically zero, in which case wi is uniformly distributed on [0; 1], the
equilibrium price (with or without price advertising) would be
p
2   1  0:41, which is
higher than in the situation with search frictions and advertised prices.38
5 Searching questions
This article has discussed a range of situations in which consumers plausibly search in a
deliberate order. We saw how sellers which were rst in line often had an incentive to set
lower prices than those further back, and this gave a consumer an incentive to mimic the
search order followed by other consumers. Likewise, consumers wish to click rst on the
advertiser which supplies the most relevant product, and advertisers with the most relevant
products had the greatest incentive to pay for a prominent position. These kinds of self-
fullling prophecies made ordered search a stable equilibrium.39 Because the seller which
is inspected rst typically makes greater prot than its rivals, sellers have an incentive to
move to the front of the queue for consumers. Ways they might have to do this include
37This contrasts with the models in Choi, Dai, and Kim (2016), Haan, Moraga-Gonzalez, and Petrikaite
(2015) and Shen (2014), where variation in a consumers ri stems from their di¤erent distributions for
match utility.
38Although the price is lower when search frictions are present, the price reduction in this example is
not su¢ cient to outweigh the direct harm to consumers caused by costly search, and consumer surplus is
higher when there are no search costs despite the higher price.
39Similar e¤ects can arise in the labour market. Mailath, Samuelson, and Shaked (2000) present a
model in which employers search for workers, and ex ante identical workers decide whether to invest in
skills before they enter the labour market. Workers are exogenously labelled with one of two colours,
which for a given skill level have no e¤ect on their productivity, and colour is observed by employers before
search. In this framework asymmetric equilibria exist in which employers concentrate their search e¤orts
on workers of one colour, while workers of the other colour are less likely to invest in skills.
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merging or co-locating alongside other sellers, advertising intensively, advertising the lowest
price, or selling other products to the pool of consumers in the past.
There are two broad themes in this paper. One is more methodological, which is to
show how the complex scenario with optimal sequential search can be reformulated as
a simple discrete choice problem without search frictions. An implication of this is that
oligopoly search models often work betterwhen the demand system is smoothed by giving
consumers heterogeneous preferences over which seller to rst inspect. (This can be done
by making consumers heterogeneous in their brand preferences or, perhaps more simply,
making them heterogeneous with respect to their seller-specic search costs.) When each
consumer views sellers as symmetric ex ante, small changes in anticipated or advertised
prices lead to a discrete jump in a sellers demand. When prices are hidden, this often
gives rise to the multiple equilibria discussed above, while when prices are advertised this
feature leads to the use of mixed pricing strategies.
A second theme is how changes in search costs a¤ect outcomes. A quite robust result
was that a multiproduct seller had an incentive to damageits retail environment: instead
of permitting consumers to see product characteristics transparently, it was more protable
to deliberately make it costly to inspect some products. When separate sellers each supply
a single product and prices are hidden, a rise in one sellers inspection cost typically cause
that seller and its rivals to raise prices. A higher inspection cost means that many of the
consumers the seller encounters are unsatised with other options and so the seller can
a¤ord to set a high price, while a rival also usually has an incentive to raise its price since
it knows consumers have less desirable alternative options. Thus, we expect there will be
positive own- and cross-cost passthrough of inspection costs, as well as the more familiar
positive passthrough of production costs. Because of this, a seller may have an incentive
to raise its own inspection cost articially as a way to relax competition. Although an
industry-wide increase in search frictions will typically raise equilibrium prices when those
prices are hidden, the opposite is likely to be the case when prices are advertised: higher
search costs make a consumer more likely to buy at the rst seller they inspect, and this
intensies competition to become the seller it is most attractive to investigate rst.
Several interesting questions for further study remain. One of these is the issue of
product design, where a seller has some freedom to choose the distribution for its match
utility (as well as its price). By incurring a cost a seller might be able to shift this
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distribution upwards, so that it o¤ers a higher-quality product. Alternatively, a seller
might be able to choose between a nicheor a mass marketdesign, where the former
is associated with a riskier distribution for match utility. Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cunat
(2012) discuss this issue in the context of monopolistic competition and random consumer
search, focussing on the impact of lower search costs on the choice of product design. It
would be interesting to investigate this in the context of ordered search. Does a prominent
seller have di¤erent incentives to choose its design from those sellers further back? While
Pandoras rule suggests that consumers would like to inspect niche (i.e., riskier) products
rst, it is less clear that a prominent seller has an incentive to o¤er a niche product design.
It would interesting to study how knowledge of which product is the current bestseller
can be used to guide optimal search. As with the classical herding models of Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), suppose that consumers buy in
sequence. Unlike these herding models, though, consumers have no private signal about
which product is better, but merely observe which product has sold the most to date. Here,
it seems plausible that, given that previous consumers have started their search process
with the then-current bestseller, a consumer should optimally start her search with the
current bestseller.40 In this scenario, it seems possible that the rst consumer buys an
inferior product and all subsequent consumers follow suit, with the result that an inferior
popular product becomes the best-seller in the long run. This would not be possible in an
alternative situation where all consumers searched randomly.
The discussion of optimal pricing and store layout in section 4.2 introduces what seems
to be a rich seam for further investigation, namely, how a multiproduct retailer should
choose its prices and its retail environment to maximize prot. Related issues arise also
in a number of public policy discussions, and this framework might be a fruitful way to
add to those discussions. For instance, is the optimal way to discourage consumption of
unhealthy products to tax them, to place them away from eye level, or to use a mixture
of both policies? In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the optimal way to
sell within some natural class of contracts and layout plans. If feasible, for instance, the
multiproduct seller in section 4.2 could charge the consumer the cost s in (8) to inspect
the product rather than make the consumer pay this cost as a search friction from which
it obtains no direct gain.
40See Sorensen (2007) and Cabral and Natividad (2014) for evidence that becoming a best-seller boosts
subsequent demand.
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This paper focussed on situations in which consumers could freely choose their order
of search. In other environments the search order is exogenously imposed. A driver on
a motorway looking for fuel encounters service stations in order, and consumers have to
decide now whether to buy the current model of phone or wait to see if a better or cheaper
model is released next year. When consumers di¤er in their search costs, a likely outcome
is that equilibrium prices fall as consumers move through the exogenous search order, in
contrast to the situations discussed in section 3. Consumers with high search costs stop
searching early, leaving later sellers to face consumers who are more inclined to shop around.
For instance, currency exchange in an airports arrivals hall might be more expensive than
outside the airport, to exploit those travellers reluctant to search for a better deal.41
Relatedly, this paper has focussed on situations in which consumers are rational, and
optimally choose the order in which they consider options. However, consumers sometimes
search through options in the order they are presented, even when there is no obvious
information content or di¤erential inspection costs to being placed in certain positions. For
instance, random position on the ballot paper can a¤ect vote share in elections. Ho and
Imai (2008) estimate that rst-listed candidates in primary or non-partisan elections for US
state or federal o¢ ces gain about two percentage points. They suggest voter behaviour can
be modelled as a search problem, where voters work their way down the list of candidates
on the ballot until they nd one which meets the required quality threshold. Coauthors of
an article are often ordered alphabetically and papers in the bibliography are listed in order
of rst authors name. This may mean that articles with one author early in the alphabet
garner more citations and that scholars early in the alphabet are asked to act as referee
more frequently.42 Unlike people, rms can choose their name to a¤ect alphabetic ordering.
McDevitt (2014) describes how 21% of Chicago plumbing rms have listed names starting
with A or a number, and also that these rms attract a disproportionate number of
consumer complaints. He interprets this as being consistent with a market with expert and
uninformed consumers, where the latter are assumed to search for a supplier in alphabetic
order (even though this is not the optimal way to search given that low-quality plumbers
apparently are listed rst).
While writing this paper, my own search for useful articles was far from random. I was
guided by keyword searches combined with citation counts from search engines and by the
41For further discussion see Arbatskaya (2007) and Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou (2009, section 4).
42See Huang (2015) and Richardson (2008), respectively.
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bibliographies in papers I had read previously, I investigated authors who worked in the
wider area and whose work I already admired, I inspected journals I expected to contain
good papers, I solicited recommended readings from colleagues, and was biased towards
sources which were more easily inspected (journal articles and working papers rather than
book chapters, say, or economics rather than marketing papers). Doubtless I have
missed interesting and relevant work. One disadvantage of ordered search, relative to the
ancient process of browsing more randomly through library shelves, is that serendipitous
discovery becomes less likely.43
Technical Appendix
A. Proof of the optimality of Pandoras rule:
For a given search procedure, let Ai be the indicator function for the consumer selecting
box i (so Ai = 1 if the consumer selects this box and otherwise Ai = 0), and let Ii be the
indicator function for inspecting box i. Since the consumer can only select a single box,
we have iAi  1, and since she must inspect a box if she selects it we have Ai  Ii. The
consumers expected payo¤ from using the search procedure is
E (iAivi   iIisi) = E (iAivi   iIi maxfvi   ri; 0g)
 E (iAi[vi  maxfvi   ri; 0g])
= E (iAiwi)
 E (maxfwig) :
Here, the rst equality holds using the denition of ri together with the fact that Ii and
vi are independent variables, while the rst inequality holds since Ai  Ii. However, the
search procedure determined by Pandoras rule has equality in these two inequalities. For
the rst, note that if the consumer inspects but does not select box i, i.e., if Ai < Ii, then
it must be that vi  ri, and for the second we have already shown that the procedure
selects the box with the highest wi. We deduce that Pandoras rule generates the highest
expected payo¤ for the consumer.
B. Duopoly example where r and v are each uniformly distributed on [0,1]:
Without loss of generality, look for an equilibrium in which equilibrium prices are
p1  p2 and let ~pi denote seller i = 1; 2s actual price. In the region 0  ~p1  p1  p2  1,
43See Foster and Ford (2003) for further discussion.
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one can calculate that seller 1s demand as a function of ~p1, which from (5) is the fraction
of consumers for whom
minfr1   p1; v1   ~p1g  maxfminfr2   p2; v2   p2g; 0g ;
is
(1  p1)(1  ~p1)(1  (1  p2)2) +
Z 1
p2
(2(1  w)(1  p1   w + p2)(1  ~p1   w + p2))dw
= 4
3
p2   23p1   23 ~p1 + ~p1p22   13 ~p1p32 + p1p22   13p1p32   p22 + 16p42 + ~p1p1   ~p1p2   p1p2 + 12 ;
which is linear in ~p1. Since seller 1 chooses ~p1 to maximize ~p1 times this demand, and this
optimal ~p1 must equal p1, we obtain the rst-order condition for p1 given p2 given by
2p21   p1p32 + 3p1p22   3p1p2   2p1 + 16p42   p22 + 43p2 + 12 = 0 : (12)
Similarly, in the region 0  p1  p2  ~p2  1, one can calculate that seller 2s demand is
(1  p2)(1  ~p2)(1  (1  p1)2) +
Z 1 ~p2+p1
p1
(2(1 w)(1  p2 w+ p1)(1  ~p2 w+ p1))dw ;
and so the rst-order condition for p2 given p1 is
3p21p2   2p21p22   p21 + 53p1p32   3p1p2 + 43p1   12p42 + 2p22   2p2 + 12 = 0 : (13)
A candidate equilibrium consists of a solution to the pair of equations (12)(13).
A symmetric equilibrium, where p1 = p2 = p say, must satisfy the equation
(1  p)  3  p  13p2 + 5p3 = 0 ;
which has a unique root in the interval (0; 1) equal approximately to p  0:49. One can
check that when p1 = p2 is equal to this root, it is indeed the optimal strategy for seller
1 to make the same choice ~p1 = p, and so this constitutes an equilibrium.44 One can
manipulate (12)(13) to obtain p1 as an explicit function of p2, and then substitute this p1
back into one of (12)(13). Doing so reveals there exists no asymmetric equilibrium with
0 < p1 < p2 < 1.
44This procedure only allows for seller 1 to choose a lower price ~p1 < p, but one can also check that an
upward deviation in its price also reduces its prot.
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C. Details of argument that more prominent sellers face more elastic demand:
Suppose all consumers search through the sellers in the same order. Suppose hypo-
thetically that all sellers are expected to charge the same price p (where p < r so that
consumers search at all), and consider a sellers elasticity of demand with respect to a
small change in its own price. By Pandoras rule, when consumers expect the same price
p < r from all sellers they will buy from the rst seller which o¤ers payo¤ v   ~p above
r p (where ~p is a sellers actual price), and if no payo¤meets this threshold they will buy
from the seller with the highest payo¤ provided this is positive. Using the terminology in
Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009), demand from consumers who buy immediately (i.e.,
if v   ~p  r   p) is a sellers fresh demand, while demand from those consumers who
buy from the seller only after exhausting all options is its return demand.45 The seller
which is mth in the search order has fresh demand in terms of its actual price ~p equal to
qF (~p) = F
m 1(r)[1  F (r + ~p  p)] : (14)
(This is because a consumer only reaches it if she did not nd a match v above r from the
previous m   1 sellers, and the consumer will then buy immediately if v   ~p  r   p.) If
there are n sellers in all, this sellers return demand is
qR(~p) =
Z r+~p p
~p
F n 1(v + p  ~p)f(v)dv =
Z r
p
F n 1(~v)f(~v + ~p  p)d~v (15)
where the rst equality follows since a rm sells to a return consumer if v  ~p is below the
threshold r   p (for otherwise she would have purchased immediately) and above all the
other rmso¤ers and the outside option of zero, and the second follows after changing
variables from v to ~v = v+ p  ~p. Thus, fresh demand is proportional to 1 F (r+ ~p  p),
scaled down geometrically as the seller is placed further back in the search order, while
return demand does not depend on the the sellers position in the search order. When
f(v)=(1  F (v)) increases with v, any sellers fresh demand is more elastic than its return
demand (evaluated at price ~p = p). To see this, note that
 q0R(p) =  
Z r
p
F n 1(~v)f 0(~v)d~v 
Z r
p
F n 1(~v)f(~v)
f(~v)
1  F (~v)d~v
 f(r)
1  F (r)
Z r
p
F n 1(~v)f(~v)d~v =  q
0
F (p)
qF (p)
qR(p) ;
45For the nal seller in the search order, all of whose demand is immediate, for consistency divide its
demand into that portion with v   ~p  r   p and with v   ~p  r   p.
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which establishes the claim.46 Since a more prominent seller (i.e., a seller with smaller m
in (14)) has a greater volume of fresh demand relative to its return demand, it follows that
this sellers total demand is more elastic than that of its rivals further back.
D. Duopoly example where r is constant and v is uniformly distributed on [0,1]:
Look for an equilibrium in which equilibrium prices satisfy p1 < p2 < r, so that all
consumers inspect seller 1 rst and if they do not buy immediately from seller 1 they go on
to inspect seller 2. From Figure 2, one can calculate that seller 1s demand as a function
of its actual price ~p1 given the anticipated price p2 from its rival is
1
2
(r2   p22)| {z }
return demand
+ 1  (r   p2 + ~p1)| {z }
immediate demand
which is linear in its price ~p1. With costless production, seller 1 chooses ~p1 to maximize
~p1 times this demand, and this optimal ~p1 must equal p1, and so we obtain the rst-order
condition for p1 given p2 given by
1
2
(r2   p22) + 1 + p2   r = 2p1 : (16)
Likewise, seller 2s demand in terms of its actual price ~p2 and anticipated prices (p1; p2) is
(1  ~p2)(r + p1   p2)  12(r   p2)2
which again is linear in price ~p2. Since seller 2 chooses ~p2 to maximize ~p2 times this demand,
and this optimal ~p2 must equal p2, the rst-order condition for p2 given p1 is
(1  2p2)(r + p1   p2) = 12(r   p2)2 : (17)
The equilibrium prices can then be explicitly (but messily) solved for each search cost
such that 1
2
 r  1 from the pair of conditions (16)-(17), and are depicted in Figure
4. (When r < 1
2
, the search cost is so high that there is no equilibrium where consumers
participate in the market.)
46Here, the rst inequality follows from the assumption that f=(1 F ) is increasing, the second inequality
also follows from f=(1  F ) being increasing and the fact that ~v  r, while the nal equality follows from
the denitions of qF and qR.
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Figure 4: Price of the prominent seller (lower curve) and non-prominent seller
These prices decrease with r, i.e., increase with the search cost s. The prices coincide when
there are no search frictions (r = 1) or when the search cost is so high that a consumer
is just willing to inspect a seller which sets the monopoly price pM = 1
2
(when r = 1
2
).
Otherwise, though, an equilibrium exists where all consumers rst inspect seller 1 and that
seller sets a strictly lower price. (Of course, a similar equilibrium also exists where all
consumers rst inspect seller 2.)
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Figure 5: Sales of the prominent seller (higher curve) and non-prominent seller
The equilibrium demand for the two sellers is shown on Figure 5, where the prominent
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seller has the greater sales. Here, the prominent sellers equilibrium demand increases
with s, while the non-prominent sellers sells less when search frictions are greater. The
corresponding prots of the two sellers, which are the result of multiplying the curves on
Figures 4 and 5, are shown on Figure 6 for the range 0:9  r  1, where the prominent
seller makes greater prot. The prominent sellers prot increases with the search cost s,
since both its price and its demand do so, while the non-prominent sellers prot depends
non-monotonically on s.
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Figure 6: Prots of the prominent seller (higher curve) and non-prominent seller
When does an equilibrium exist in which sellers set the same price, say p, and consumers
are indi¤erent about their order of search? Suppose a fraction  of consumers rst inspect
seller 1 when anticipated prices are equal. By considering Figure 2 above, one can check
that seller 1s demand when it chooses actual price ~p is

 
1
2
(r2   p2) + 1  (r   p+ ~p)| {z }
rst inspect seller 1
+ (1  )  (1  ~p)r   1
2
(r   p)2| {z }
rst inspect seller 2
;
and the rst-order condition for this seller to choose ~p = p is

 
1
2
(r2   p2) + 1  (r + p)+ (1  )  (1  2p)r   1
2
(r   p)2 = 0 :
The corresponding expression for seller 2 to be willing to choose ~p = p is the same except
 and 1    are permuted. As such, the only situation in which both sellers are willing
to choose the same price is when  = 1
2
, in which case the equilibrium price satises
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(1+r)p+p2 = 1. Thus, if the tie-breakingrule is such that more than half the consumers
rst inspect one seller when anticipated prices are equal, the only equilibria in this market
involves ordered search where one seller sets a strictly lower price than its rival.
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